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Two revealing articles taken from the European Movement's excellent website euromove.org.uk are featured below:-
Common Foreign & Security Policy
The founders of the European Community were committed to a peaceful, democratic Europe; they were adamant that the mistakes that led to two World Wars should never be made again. It was with these principles in mind that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) entered into force with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
What is CFSP? Following the end of the Cold War, as superpower influence gradually receded in Europe, it became necessary for European member states to take more responsibility for their own security. The experience of the Cold War had thwarted several previous attempts at European cooperation in this field, but it had also made it apparent that, in international affairs, the only successful action would be collective action. In creating the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a new three-pillar structure, combining the Community - based on the three original Treaties: EEC, Euratom and ECSC (Pillar I) - with two new pillars: Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP provides for the eventual framing of a common defence policy which, in the words of the Maastricht Treaty, "might in time lead to a common defence". It is based on intergovernmental decision-making and has been left almost entirely outside of the Community legal framework. The EU institutions currently have a very limited scope for participation. However, in other aspects of EU external relations, the other institutions do have a role. The Commission is responsible for negotiations on international trade matters and the Agenda 2000 programme of reform in Central and Eastern Europe. The European Parliament has a Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security and also has the right of assent to international treaties and future enlargement of the EU. Co-ordination of the different EU institutions in the field of foreign affairs is therefore important and on occasion difficult to manage. It was agreed at Maastricht that CFSP should operate through non-binding instruments such as common statements, declarations and demarches, and through two legally binding instruments: Common Positions to provide the framework within which the EU and its member states act collectively and Joint Actions to provide the means to do so. The Yugoslav crisis and the road to Amsterdam The war in former Yugoslavia made it clear that the Union needed to be able to act to avert disaster and not merely react after the event. It also exposed the weakness of uncoordinated reactions by member state governments. It was acknowledged that there was an urgent need for reform if CFSP was to function effectively. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 provided a focal figure for the development of CFSP in the person of the High Representative, a position currently filled by Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO. A much needed Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was also established so that the EU might be sufficiently prepared for rapidly escalating crises such as in Kosovo. Most importantly, the Treaty introduced a new legally binding instrument for making policy, the Common Strategy, which was designed to focus on areas where member states have important interests in common. The European Council has so far agreed Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the western Balkans and the Mediterranean region (including the Middle East Peace Process). The objectives of these Common Strategies have been to foster peace and security in Europe, encourage the development of democratic and legitimate institutions, and ultimately to prepare some of the countries involved for eventual succession to the Union itself. How are CFSP decisions taken? The Common Positions, Joint Actions and Common Strategies of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are decided exclusively by unanimity. However, under the Amsterdam Treaty, any Common Positions and Joint Actions arising from an established Common Strategy can be decided by Qualified Majority if all member states agree with this in principle. CFSP is not an inflexible body of regulation: national interests are ultimately safeguarded in that any single member state can block a CFSP joint action, if it strongly disapproves of it. Moreover, the option of constructive abstention allows a member state that does not wish to take part in a joint action to stand aside whilst allowing other members of the EU to proceed unanimously. That member state's only obligation is then to ensure that its national policy does not actively contradict the EU joint strategy. As far as the EU member states' commitment to NATO is concerned, the first guiding principle of the Cologne European Council in 1999 is unequivocal in its intention: NATO constitutes and will continue to constitute the key to collective security in Europe. The EU's only motive in giving itself the independent means for collective action is to be able to respond to security issues that lie outside of Alliance's remit. In this spirit, all decisions under CFSP will be formulated in close partnership with NATO. An opportunity for Britain The British government fully supports an effective EU foreign policy and recognises the advantages of speaking with one voice on international affairs. This is because the added political weight implied by participation in CFSP and the extra resources available within it will undeniably give Britain greater influence internationally. After all, the UK's pivotal position in maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance during the Kosovo campaign would not have been possible without its new standing in the EU. While Britain has made clear its commitment to playing an active role in formulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it should also be recognised that CFSP presents Britain with an opportunity to take a lead in Europe. Our unique relationship with so many parts of the world places Britain in a particularly good position to shape and influence EU foreign policy-making. In fact, several other EU member states are already looking to British participation to give CFSP the weight it needs to work effectively. Leadership in such an influential area of EU policy would undoubtedly improve Britain's long-suffering profile in European affairs. How can CFSP be improved? It is clear that the structure is in place for a highly effective foreign and security policy at the European level. What is now lacking is some kind of declaration of the collective goals of the member states. The introduction of the Common Strategy at Amsterdam has gone some way to resolving this problem, but the collective aims therein focus narrowly on individual regions and do not allow an overarching perspective of what CFSP is trying to achieve. The underlying principles of CFSP should be made clear if the project is to have any credibility with EU citizens. Another focus for reform concerns the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens. Even purely for the purposes of accountability, there should be some legal means of ensuring that these rights are protected in the decisions made under CFSP. While it is acknowledged that foreign policy and defence are fields of policy rather than of law, it is arguable the European Court of Justice should have jurisdiction in some aspects of CFSP, at least where the fundamental rights of individuals are affected. It is hoped that the introduction of a European Charter of Fundamental Rights will foster progress on this issue. Ultimately, a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy depends on institutional reform. The European Parliament has praised the use of qualified majority voting in CFSP decision-making as a framework for rapid and effective response to international crises. A more proactive policy on QMV would act to streamline the functioning of CFSP yet further. Moreover, while the intergovernmental nature of CFSP denies the EU institutions a role in decision-making, more should be done to keep the Commission and the Parliament abreast of developments in CFSP, as is their right under the Treaties. Since the Council has been severely criticised for failing to live up to its promises in this respect, it is advisable that the jurisdiction of the ECJ be extended to ensure the fulfilment of Treaty procedures and obligations. Is EU enlargement possible? The sad truth about the question of the enlargement of the European Union is that not many people in the UK care much about it. This is because not many people have thought about it that much - there are other things to worry about. There is a general sense, of course, that the EU ought to include the whole of Europe rather than just those areas within three hours' train journey from Brussels. If you look at Europe on a map, that is the shape you see. But there is more to enlargement, much more, than merely the idea that it ought to happen. The benefits of a larger EU are well-known but still worth restating: a wider area of peace and security; enlarged markets and increased prosperity; greater opportunities for all our people. It is the cost that will eventually cause people to think twice. The Common Agricultural Policy cannot be extended to the countries of central and eastern Europe - already it is the largest single item in the EU budget and there are many small farmers in the applicant states. The EU's foreign policy stance toward the United States, the Mediterranean and Russia will need to be developed, to bring more coherence to what is too often an unclear muddle. And the decision-making institutions in Brussels will become more like a supranational parliamentary system, and less dependent on national vetoes and messy intergovernmental compromise. The people in the EU who will oppose these reforms have not yet realised that enlargement will necessarily require them. But when they do, we will have a fight on our hands. There are many good reasons for implementing these reforms even within an EU of 15, regardless of the queue of new members waiting to join. But many of the most committed advocates of these reforms (among whom I think I may include myself) realise that they can only be brought about on the basis of what else they will make possible, rather than simply being accepted as a good thing in their own right. Enlargement is therefore an opportunity for those who wish to see deepening, and not a threat. However, there is a more important obstacle in the road towards enlargement than that posed by its opponents. This is the distraction posed by the creation of the European single currency. The introduction of the euro will have such far-reaching effects on the whole of Europe that it is essential to ensure that the project is a success. This is absorbing every political and business attention - the rest of the European agenda is a distant second place. When the single currency has been introduced, and is seen to be working successfully, however, the European Union will be transformed. There will be a new burst of energy for growth and reform, comparable to but exceeding the excitement of the late 1980s. This new enthusiasm will extend in every aspect of the European agenda, including the question of enlargement. The old objections to reform will weaken in the face of a new drive and motivation throughout our continent. In the first decade of the new century, the divide imposed by Yalta will be removed from the maps. For our children, it will be no more than a historical curiosity, like the Holy Roman Empire or the Viking invasions. It happened here once, but not any more.
History lesson for money changers By David Goldfield, published in Europe 89, January/February edition. 'In heaven's name, why can't we all have one money?' Such was the despairing cry of a British farmer who came badly unstuck two years ago when branching out as an agent in Britain for French sugar-beet harvesters. . . . His problem has existed on and off since trade began. But our farmer would have been better placed in 86AD than 1986. For, as part of the Roman Empire, Britain then shared a common currency with the rest of the civilised world. . . . So is it 'Come back, Claudius, all is forgiven? I hear they have recently excavated the main Roman bank in Colchester. It had no foreign exchange department. It didn't need one. Editor's comment: No forgiveness from the Queen of the Iceni.
A united Europe? We like it Extract form a ECC publicity newsletter 1988. Page carries a line drawing of a battle tank with a flag of Europe flying from an aerial. The bi-annual poll of public opinion in the Community, Eurobarometer, based on questions put to 21,000 men and women throughout the 12 members states, shows that popular support, shows that popular support for the idea of a united Europe is growing - even to a common defence force. Respondents were asked: "Are you personally for or against the EC developing toward becoming a United States of Europe?" Two in three Europeans are personally 'for' or 'rather for' the United States of Europe concept. In the six original member countries the figure is even higher 70 per cent. Eighty three per cent of the British expect the fight against terrorism in January 2000 to be fought at a european level of government. They are also in favour of a fully-grown European Government, endowed with appropriate powers, in a United States of Europe. More than two in three Danes think alike with regard to fighting terrorism, but are afraid of a loss of national identity with respect to political union. The French National Assembly rejected the idea of a European Defence Community in August 1954. Today, 51 per cent of the French citizens polled expect a European Defence Community by January 2000. More positive yet on that score are the British:58 per cent think that 13 years from now 'our soldiers within the EC will have the same type of arms and equipment and will assure together the security of the EC against threats from the outside.' Moshe Dayan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali before the Council of Europe Assembly By Francesco Cerri, ANSA correspondent, published in the Forum, Council of Europe April, 1979. European role? One point, however, on which both Israeli and Egyptian were agreed was in calling on Europe, and especially the EEC, to take economic steps to assist the refugees in the occupied territories and in the Lebanese and Jordanian camps. Moshe Dayan thought this might take the form of a Marshall Plan on the European model. The appeal is probably not unrelated to the considerable economic difficulties currently facing the State of Israel, which apparently cannot or will not invest in the social infrastructures which the refugees require (hospitals, schools, etc) But, while Dayan thought that should be the extent of Europe's role, the view of the Eqyptian Foreign Minister was that since the possibility of failure in the present negotiations could not be excluded, Europe could make ready now to put forward alternative solutions to the one so far advocated by the USA alone. This is an indication which, in a European context constantly moving in a pro-Palestinian direction, could prove highly significant in broadening the negotiations. A proposal from Europe, less committed than Washington to either of the parties involved, could not doubt open new prospects. The European governments now have the ball in their court.
Maastricht Treaty THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS Introduction 1. WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. 2. WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role. WEU Member States take note of Article J.4 relating to the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union which reads as follows: "1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 2. The union requests the Western Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. 3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3. 4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. 6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then." A. WEU's relations with European Union 3. The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. To this end, WEU will take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union: - as appropriate, synchronization of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonization of working methods; - establishment of close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other; - consideration of the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies; - arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union; - encouragement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament. The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. B. WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance 4. The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance. - WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. - Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods harmonized. - Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats - General of WEU and NATO. C. Operational role of WEU 5. WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular: -WEU planning cell; - closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance; - meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff; - military units answerable to WEU. Other proposals will be examined further including: - enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency; -development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy. Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies.
D. Other measures 6. As a consequence of the measures set out above, and in order to facilitate the strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels. 7. Representation of the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Member States may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the European Union. 8. WEU notes that, in accordance with the provisions of Article J.4(6) concerning the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union, the Union will decide to review the provisions of this Article with a view to furthering the objective to be set by it in accordance with the procedure defined. The WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996. This re-examination will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. II. DECLARATION by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are members of the Western European Union. "The Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security and defence identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European States on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this spirit, they propose the following: States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU. The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992." Editor's comment: The original Roman Empire was also divided into the Western and Eastern halves. If anybody would like to explain what the above section of the Maastricht Treaty means in plain English - send it to: editor@euro-army.co.uk The draft Federal Constitution Index Chapter I: General Articles Chapter II: The Legislature Chapter III: The Executive Chapter IV: The Judiciary power Chapter V: The competences of the Union Chapter VI: Amendments to the Constitution Chapter VII: Changes to the Territory of the Union- Preamble We, the peoples of the European Union, * acknowledging our commitment to co-operation, solidarity, tolerance and respect for our diversity and different identities, * recognising the importance of regional co-operation and understanding for peace and prosperity in Europe, * believing that the peoples of Europe, having shown how ancient enmities and hatreds can be replaced by peace and friendship, must complete their progress towards an all-European federation, and that in doing so they will set an example to the world, * knowing that the only path forward for our continent is one of ever deeper integration and of ever closer union between the peoples of Europe, * convinced that many of the biggest problems confronting us today, such as social exclusion, pollution, unemployment and racism can no longer be adequately dealt with by our individual states, and therefore need a transnational solution, * believing that a truly democratic and federal European Union respects and protects our different identities and cultural heritage and has the necessary legitimacy to lead us into the next century, * supporting the objective of bringing democracy as close as possible to the citizens by placing the competences at their most appropriate level, according to the principle of subsidiary, CONSTITUTION Chapter I: General Articles Article 1 The European Union, hereafter called "Union", is formed by the following Member States, Belgique-België-Belgien, Danmark, Deutschland, Ellas, España, France, Ireland, Italia, Luxembourg, Nederland, Österreich, Portugal, Suomi-Finland, Sverige, United-Kingdom of Great-Britain and Northern Ireland. Article 2 The Union derives all its powers from the shared sovereignty of its Member States and the citizens of the Union. Article 3 No citizen of the Union can be discriminated against on the basis of one's beliefs, religion, race, nationality, language, gender or sexual orientation. Article 4 A citizen of the Union is a person holding the citizenship of a Member State. Article 5 Any citizen of the Union, any permanent legal resident or any Member State has the right to petition the Court of Justice to hear its case under European law. Article 6 All citizens of the Union, which have reached the age of 18, have the right to vote and stand for office in all elections in their State of residence in the same way as citizens of that State. Article 7 Any official language in a Member State is an official language of the Union. The citizens of the Union may use these languages in all communication with the institutions of the Union. The Union flag is described as such : "Against the background of blue sky, twelve golden five-pointed stars form a circle, representing the union of the peoples of Europe. The number of stars is invariable, twelve being the symbol of perfection and entirety." The European Anthem is the "Ode to Joy", arranged from the last movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. The European feast day is the 9th May. Chapter II: The Legislature Article 8 The European Assembly is the legislature of the Union. It consists of two chambers, the European Parliament and the Senate of the Union, hereafter called "Senate", both having the same powers. Either chamber, as well as the Commission following the procedure laid down in article 21 of this Constitution, has the right to propose legislation and a simple majority in both chambers is necessary to make the laws of the Union, except in the cases foreseen by this Constitution. All laws of the Union have direct effect and are directly applicable. Article 9 After a proposal for legislation receives the necessary majority in either chamber of the European Assembly, it shall be submitted to the other chamber. This latter will indicate to the originating chamber within sixty days whether it rejects or accepts the proposal with or without amendments. If it fails to do so, the proposal will become law. If it rejects the proposal, the proposal is defeated. If the two chambers of the European Assembly reach the necessary majority on two differing versions of a proposal for legislation, their versions are brought before the Conciliation Committee of the European Assembly, consisting of an equal number of representatives of each chamber. The Conciliation Committee will endeavour to make a common version from the two differing versions. If such a common text is agreed upon by a majority within the representation of both chambers, it will return for a final vote in the two chambers. If the vote fails in either chamber, the proposal is defeated. Article 10 The European Parliament consists of 650 members, elected every five years by a uniform election procedure, laid down in the electoral laws of the Union. No member of the European Parliament shall be in the same time member of the Senate, or member of the Commission, or member of the Court of Justice, or member of the parliament or of the government of a Member State. The electoral laws of the Union may provide for more incapabilities. Article 11 The Senate consists of one member per Member State, hereafter called "Senator". The Member States shall decide the mode of election of their Senator. Each Senator has one vote. Article 12 When the Union makes a proposal for the harmonization of the legislations of the Member States, following the procedure laid down in Article 35 of this Constitution, the Senate shall be replaced by the Council of Ministers, hereafter called "Council". The Council shall consist of one member per Member State, appointed by the government of its Member State, notwithstanding the provisions of the following alineas of this article. Representatives of regional authorities invested with legislative and executive powers over the subject concerned by the Council may fully participate in the decision-making process of the Council. The representatives of regional authorities only represent their regional Their votes are relative to the number of inhabitants they represent. This number and any future changes to it are notified to the Council. For the determination of the majority of Member States, they will be counted not as one Member State but as a fraction, representing the number of their citizens divided by the total number of inhabitants of the Member State of which they form a sub-entity. Article 13 A simple majority in the Senate is a majority of its members. A qualified majority in the Senate is a three quarter majority of its members. A simple majority in the European Parliament is a majority of the members present and voting, without counting abstentions. A qualified majority in the European Parliament is a three quarter majority of the members present and voting. Neither chamber of the European Assembly can vote on legislation, without a majority of its members voting. The Council always takes its decisions by a three quarter majority of its members. Article 14 All sessions of the European Assembly are open to the public and the agendas, minutes and voting records of all plenary sessions are to be published and available to the public. Chapter III: The Executive Article 15 The executive powers are vested upon the Commission, which is composed of a maximum of fifteen members. The Commission may not count more than one member coming from the same Member State. Article 16 The European Assembly elects the members of the Commission among the members of the European Parliament by a simple majority after each integral renewal of the European Parliament. The members of the Commission which put an end to their function get back their mandates of members of the European Parliament. Article 17 The European Assembly elects the President of the European Union, hereafter called "President", and the Vice-President of the Commission, hereafter called "Vice-President", by a simple majority, among the members of the Commission, for a term of one year. These mandates are not renewable for the following year. The leaving President may not be elected Vice-President. If the President is not able to assume its function, in cases of disease, death, or impeachment, the Vice-President shall take office and shall continue the term. If he assumed the function of President for more than 6 months, the Vice-President may not be elected as President, the following year. Article 18 The Commission can only be dismissed by the European Assembly by the appointment of a new Commission. The European Assembly may force one or several members of the Commission to resign upon a proposal of one third of the members of either house of the European Assembly. Article 19 The Commission takes all decisions collectively. Article 20 The Commission represents the Union in external relations, in the implementation of its foreign, security and defence policies and in international organisations. Article 21 The Commission has the right to propose legislation. A proposal by the Commission has to be presented to the European Parliament. Article 22 The President negotiates and concludes all treaties on behalf of and within the areas of exclusive competence of the Union. Treaties concluded by the Commission enter into force after ratification by the European Assembly, by a simple majority. Article 23 The President shall have the right to engage European Union military forces outside the territory of the Union, if a qualified majority in the European Assembly gives it the mandate to do so, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 24. Article 24 The President shall be in command of the European Union military forces. No military unit can be engaged outside of the territory of the Union over the objections of the Member State to which this unit belongs. Chapter IV: The Judicial power Article 25 The judicial power of the Union is vested upon the Court of Justice. It extends to all cases in law, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the Union and the treaties established under this Constitution. Any dispute over the competences of the Union and the competences of its institutions will be resolved by the Court of Justice. Article 26 The Court of Justice will be composed by a number of judges equal to the number of Member States, appointed by the European Assembly by a simple majority vote in each chamber. Those chosen will be selected from among the most eminent jurists for a mandate of nine years. A judge can only serve for one mandate. The mandate of a judge can only be terminated before its expiration, for cause of death, resignation or by a ruling of the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice can only rule on the termination of a judge's mandate for violations of the laws, criminal conviction or behaviour which could lead to the disrepute of the Court. Article 27 The judges of the Court of Justice will choose from amongst their midst a president for a renewable mandate of three years. The president chairs the meetings of the Court of Justice and represents the Court of Justice in its dealings. Article 28 The rulings of the Court of Justice will be binding within the territory of the Union. They shall take precedence over and the Court of Justice can annul all legislative acts, which it finds in conflict with this Constitution. Article 29 The Court of Justice has the right to hear any case on Union legislation brought before it. Article 30 The European Assembly has the right to establish, by a qualified majority, lower courts, without prejudice to the competences of the Court of Justice as set out in this Constitution. Article 31 This Constitution and the laws and treaties adopted, or to be adopted, under it will be the supreme law of the Union and judges in every Member State will be bound hereby, any thing in the constitutions or laws of the Member States notwithstanding. Article 32 The Union is a party to the European Convention of Human Rights and the Convention and its covenants will take precedence over all laws of the Union. Article 33 Any conflict arising between this Constitution, the legislation and treaties made under it or the constitutions or laws of any of the Member States and the European Convention on Human Rights, will be decided upon by the European Court for Human rights and its verdicts will be binding on all courts within the territory of the Union. Chapter V: The competences of the Union Article 34 The Union shall be competent to the exclusion of its Member States in the following areas: I. Within the field of Economic and Commercial Policy for: The creation, the maintenance and the adaptation of a single market, with free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, within the European Union, including: Copyright and trademark legislation; Competition Policy; State aids; Fisheries; Agricultural policy; Energy and nuclear power; Trans-European networks; Mutual recognition of diplomas of higher education; Monetary policy and the management of a single currency; Customs union and tariffs, antidumping legislation, external trade and commercial policy II. Within the field of Foreign and Security Policy for: Defence of the territory of the Union and its outside frontiers, upholding of the principles of the United Nations around the world. The making of treaties on behalf of the European Union within its exclusive competences. III. Within the field of Justice and Home Affairs for: Immigration and border controls; The fight against organised, transnational crime IV. Environmental legislation in cases where more than one Member State is affected. This does not preclude the European Assembly to entrust the Member States with the execution of the laws it passes within its exclusive competences, under the supervision of the Commission. Article 35 The Union and the Member States have shared competences in the fields of: I. Within the field of Economic and Monetary Policy for: Consumer protection; Social policy; Research and technology; Natural resources II. Within the field of Foreign and Security Policy for Foreign aid III. Citizenship and Human Rights IV. Culture and Higher Education V. Tourism Within these areas the Union has the right to harmonise the legislations of the Member States and to pass legislation providing a framework within which its Member States can act. The implementation of this legislation shall be supervised and co-ordinated by the Commission acting in co-operation with the governments of the Member States, represented in the Council, as provided in Article 12. Article 36 The Member States shall have exclusive competence in all areas not foreseen in this Constitution and not entering in the scope of Article 37 of this Constitution. Article 37 The European Assembly shall have the power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution its competences and all other competences vested by this Constitution into the institutions of the Union. In all areas that do not affect the interests of more than one Member State, the Member States, or the appropriate regional or local authorities shall have the right to pass legislation in as far as this legislation does not impinge upon an overriding interest of the Union. Article 38 The European Assembly promulgates the laws of the Union and the Commission executes them, unless this Constitution decides otherwise. Article 39 The budget of the Union is voted by a simple majority in the European Assembly, in as far as it does not exceed 3% of its gross domestic product. A budget rise of the Union beyond 3% of its gross domestic product, has to be approved by the European Assembly with a qualified majority in both Houses. Chapter VI: Amendments to the Constitution Article 40 Any of the institutions which have the right to propose legislation, or a number of citizens of the Union practised in the electoral laws of the Union have the right to submit to the European Parliament, their proposals for amendments to the Constitution. At the end of its mandate, the European Parliament can then by a simple majority propose to the next European Assembly amendments to the Constitution. The newly elected European Parliament and the Senate can then amend the Constitution by qualified majority in both chambers. Article 41 The current Constitution will enter into force after a three quarter majority of the Member States, by a procedure laid down by the Member State, approve it and the European Assembly ratifies it by a qualified majority. The Union will take over the acquis communautaire. Chapter VII: Changes to the Territory of Union Article 42 Any European state which respects the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights has the right to become a Member State of the Union, if its accession agreement is approved by a qualified majority in both houses of the European Assembly, or by the citizens of the Union and the Member States, by a procedure laid down in article 45. Article 43 Any Member State shall have the right to secede from the Union if its citizens expresses itself for secession from the Union. One year after notification of the European Commission the seceding Member State will be freed from all obligations towards the Union and its membership will terminated. Article 44 Any change to the number of Member States shall be accepted by the concerned Member States, and by the citizens of the Union and the Member States, following a procedure laid down in article 45. Any territorial change between the Member States shall be accepted by the concerned Member States and their citizens. Article 45 Acts submitted to the vote of the citizens of the Union are accepted by the majority of the voters. Acts submitted to the vote of the citizens of the Union and the Member States are accepted when the majority of voters and the majority of Member States approve them. The result of a referendum in a Member State is the voice of the Member State. Editor's comment: Well there we have it, Articles 23 and 24, say it all. For 'president' substitute Caesar!
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